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To evaluate the government intervention effects on growth of rice production in Iran, the nominal 
protective rate was calculated and a Nerlove supply model was applied to a time series of 1983-
1998. The results showed that in the majority of these years, producers has not been supported 
and therefore, redirecting the rice market is recommended. In order to get more efficient 
approach than the government intervention, diminishing the share of the government in the 
market and strengthening the private sector may be listed on the top of a list that could be 
regarded as a plan for making rice production profitable. 
 
Key words: nominal protection rate, rice, Iran 
 
Introduction 
A variety of programs, such as price support, input subsidies and so on was adopted by the post-
revolution government in the 1980s in an effort to achieve and maintain national self-sufficiency 
in basic agriculture products. Since 1990, policy has been directed toward abolishing subsidies 
within a strategy of achieving economic liberalization and a more competitive and market-
oriented sector. However, the government appears to be the largest economic agent by controlling 
nearly three forth of economic activities and there are still markets such as wheat, cotton and rice 
in which the government intervene in order to support either producers or consumers.  
 
Farmers traditionally produce rice particularly in the northern areas and so they most likely 
cannot easily adapt a new crop pattern in which rice is excluded. Moreover, some type of 
domestic rice, e.g. Taromi, is highly acceptable by the consumers and so they can compete with 
imported rice. However, producing rice is believed to be unfair due to the lack of water causing 
from successive drought in recent years and because of the lack of comparative advantage (e.g. 
Haj-Rahimi, 1997).   2
 
Rice is a main food in Iran particularly in the northern areas where the majority of the product is 
produced. According to the FAO database, the per capita consumption of rice was 18.6 kg in 
1961 and reached to around 34 kg in 1999 indicating an average growth of  1.6% per annum. As 
shown in Figure (1), while the gap between domestic production and consumption of rice 
fluctuates between 1961 and 1999, and although the production of rice has been increased during 
the last years, a sustainable share of consumption, e.g. a little over 20% in 1995, is imported into 
Iran each year.  
 







































The Iranian government intervene the rice market by controlling its import to support consumers 
and to prevent rising the price of rice in the country. Among the factors affecting the increasing 
gap between production and consumption of rice, direct and indirect policies of the government is 
highlighted. These policies include input subsidies, credit programs, guaranteed price, 
distribution of coupon and importing rice using foreign exchange evaluated with an special cheap 
rate allocated for food. Najafi (1999), discussed that most of these programs have been inefficient 
and caused widening the gap. As results, a shortage of the product exist each year and thus, the 
government imports rice spending the official exchange money (e.g. $1 = 3000 Rials in 1998), by 
which the imported rice is apparently cheaper than the domestic rice. However, the imported rice 
is more expensive than the domestic rice when the prices are evaluated with real exchange rate in 
the gray market (e.g. $1 = 8000 Rials in 1998).    3
 
According to Bakhshoodeh and Akbari (2001), the consumer price of rice is higher than the 
producers price as well as the world price evaluated with the exchange rate in the gray market. 
They also discussed that the multi rate system of foreign exchange not only causes misallocation 
of foreign stocks but can also lead to some ambiguous policies and mistaken evaluation of basic 
economic figures such as prices.  
 
As shown in Figure 2, the price received by the farmers is less than that of imported price that 
explicitly refers to the fact that farmers are taxed. 
 





































Despite the increasing price of rice, the per capita consumption of the product is almost high. As 
show in Figure 3, the average consumption of milled rice per person was 18.6 kg in 1961 and 
reached to nearly 34 kg in 1999. The figure even has reached to around 45 kg in 1977 and 1995. 
Comparing the world average annual growth of 0.08% for per capita consumption between 1961 
and 1996, the figure has been increasing by more than 2.6% in Iran. 
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This paper focuses in evaluating the effects of government intervene in rice market in Iran. For 
this purpose, the rest of the paper is structured as follows: the methods and theoretical basis are 
given below followed by a short description of data and variables. Then, the findings are 




In order to evaluate the government policies in agricultural production, supply function has been 
widely used (e.g. Lin, 1977; Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988; Gunawardana and Oczkowski, 
1992, Zibaii and Najafi, 1993 and Zare, 1996).  
 
In this study, nominal protection rate (NPR) is first used to evaluate the effects of the government 
intervention in rice market. With no intervention, the domestic price of rice (Pd) is expected to be 
around that in border level (Pb). Thus, NPR is defined as: 
 
NPR = (Pb/Pd)  –1        (1) 
 
A protective price requires the NPR to be positive. 
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Then, a partial adjustment model introduced by Nerlove (1956) is used to evaluate the effects of 
government intervention in rice market in Iran. Following Houck and Ryan (1972) and Lin 
(1977), NPR was included into the model as indicated in equation 2: 
 
Yt = α0i + α1Pt-1 + α2NPR + α3T + α4Yt-1 + εt       (2) 
 
Where Yt and Yt-1 are the production of rice at periods t and t-1; Pt-1 is the lagged price of the 
product at period t-1 and T exhibits the trend variable. αs  are the coefficients to be estimated and 
εt is the usual error term. 
 
The data used in this study are time series of farm-level price and production of rice in the period 
of 1983 to 1998 that are published by the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) of Iran. In order 
to achieve the real prices, the nominal prices were adjusted using the consumer price indices 
(CPI) provided by different issues of records in Statistical Center of Iran. Because the large share 
of rice is imported from Thailand, the price of rice from this country is considered as world price 
(Pw). These prices are collected from annual database of FAO that is converted to the real border 
equivalent price (Pb) using the exchange rate in the gray market (e.g. 1$ = 234.25 Rials in 1980 
and 1$ = 8657 Rials in 1999). To calculate these rates, which are important in calculating the 
NPR, the equity of purchasing power parity and was used as: 
 
Et = (CPIt / P
*
t ) Eo           ( 3 )  
 
Where Et is the real exchange rate, CPIt and P
*
t are domestic and foreign (Thailand) consumer 
price indices respectively, and Eo is the exchange rate at 1990 as the base year. 
 
Then, Pb was calculated as: 
 
Pb = (Pw+ Tw) + Td - Cd         (4) 
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In which, Tw is freight cost and (Pw+ Tw) indicates the CIF price diverted to the local currency, 
Rials, using the exchange rate in gray market. Td and Cd are costs of local transporting from 
border to domestic market and from farm to domestic market, respectively.  
 
Auto-correlation Function (ACF) plot that is a useful identification and diagnostic aid and the 
unit root test were used to test the stationary of the time series data and regarding LB-test results 
and cointegration test, variables T and NPR were excluded from the model. 
 
Results 
In this section, the calculated NPR for the period of 1983 to 1995 are discussed followed by the 
description of the supply coefficients. As indicated in Table 1 and Figure 4, NPR is negative for 
most years. Therefore, there have not been enough incentives for rice exports. 
 
Table 1. NPR for rice in Iran, 1983-96 
1983 1984 1985  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
-0.14 -0.26 -0.21 -0.08 0.13 0.12 -0.40 -0.21 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.15 -0.37 -0.58 -0.44 -0.48 
 




























The stationary test showed that some variables are not stationary and therefore performing a 
cointegration test revealed that the lagged nominal price of rice Pt-1 and that of production level   7
should be included into the model. The estimated coefficients and the related statistics are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Supply function parameters of rice, Iran  
















The NPR and the real price of rice were excluded because of not being cointegrated with the 
dependent variable. However, a Nerlove model including these two variables exhibited an 
unexpected negative sign for both of them. To double-check the signs, covariance analysis and 
correlation test were performed by which the signs were confirmed. Thus, it may be said that rice 
producers consider factors beyond the price of rice and NPR in production. These factors may be 
listed as the relative profitability of the product, the rotation possibilities at least in some areas, 
high relative price of rice, weather conditions in favour of producing rice rather than the other 
potential competitive products. 
 
Rice market liberalization can be regarded as an alternative in order to improve society welfare. 
Based on the study of Bakhshoodeh and Akbari (2001), the major effect of rice market 
liberalization in Iran is to appear in decreasing the governmental revenue as well as domestic 
suppliers’ welfare, but it increases the consumers’ gain. As it is expected, the rice imports goes 
up because of the simultaneous decrease in domestic supply and increase in demand. It may be 
said that the rice producer may find trading more economical than rice producing.  
 
Conclusions 
Based on the results, it may be said that the governmental policy against rice market to achieve a 
stable price has not been successful. The negative NPR for the majority of the studied years 
indicates that rice producers have not been really supported by the government. Therefore, the   8
increased level of production is due to other factors such as its relative profitability. Despite that 
rice production has been increased, the consumption has gone up such that the shortages have 
been imported using a subsidized foreign exchange rate. In general, the implemented policies for 
supporting rice producers in order to achieve a stable price and income, has end up with an 
unwanted outcomes mainly against the general objective of self-sufficiency in agricultural 
products.  
 
With regard to improving the situation, the followings may be recommended: 
•  The government should buy 10 to 20 per cent of produced rice at harvesting season with an 
agreed price in order to supply them in out-seasons to capture the shortages. 
•  Considering the lack of water due to recent droughts, the consumption of rice should be 
redirected in such a way that the per capita consumption decreases toward the world price. 
For this purpose, abolishing distribution of coupon can be considered as a policy by which the 
consumption can be controlled. 
•  The devoted subsidized foreign exchange to rice imports is considered as a policy against the 
domestic producers and therefore, the subsidized foreign exchange for importing rice should 
be abolished. 
•  Considering the low efficiency level of government activities, the role of the government in 
rice market should be diminished. A possibility is to promote the private sector and to 
liberalize the rice market. For getting better results, the third suggestion might be 
implemented before privatization.    
•  Despite the fact that domestic rice is not considered an export commodity, some varieties may 
be potentially considered for the purpose of exports. In this regard, removing  exporting 
barriers is highly recommended. 
 
It is believed that implementing above recommendations could increase the market efficiency of 
rice in Iran and this caused the scare resources especially water to be allocated optimally.  
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